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Davis and Palmer: Civil Procedure
A TRIBUTE TO THOMAS E. McHUGH

Special)

Virginia Habitual Criminal Statute. ' 404
He concluded the opinion stating that "[w]hether the conviction of a crime
outside of West Virginia may be the basis for application of the West Virginia
Habitual Criminal Statute, W.Va. Code,40561-11-18, -19 [1943], depends upon the
classification of that crime in this State.

S.

CollateralEstoppel

40 6 Justice McHugh
In the case of State v. Porter,
held that "[t]he principle
of collateral estoppel applies in a criminal case where an issue of ultimate fact has
once been determined by a valid and final judgment. In such
case, that issue may
407
not again be litigated between the State and the defendant.,

V. CIVIL PROCEDURE

A.

Motion to Dismiss

Relying on the decision in Chapman v. Kane Transfer Co.,40 8 Justice
McHugh held in Dunlap v. Hinkle40 9 that "[t]he trial court, in appraising the
sufficiency of a complaint on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, should not dismiss the
complaint unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff41can
prove no set of facts
0
in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.
B.

Summary Judgment

Justice McHugh took the opportunity in Brown v. Bluefield Municipal
Building Commission41' to restate a rule of law fashioned in Masinter v. Webco
Co.4 12 The court in Brown held that "[e]ven if the trial judge is of the opinion to
direct a verdict, he should nevertheless ordinarily hear evidence and, upon a trial,
direct a verdict
rather than try the case in advance on a motion for summary
413
judgment.

404

Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.

405

Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.

406
407

392 S.E.2d 216 (W. Va. 1990).
Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.

408

236 S.E.2d 207 (W. Va. 1977).

409

317 S.E.2d 508 (W. Va. 1984).

410

Id. at Syl. Pt 2.

411

280 S.E.2d 101 (W. Va. 1981).

412

262 S.E.2d 433 (W. Va. 1980).

413

280 S.E.2d at Syl.
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In Community Bank and Trust, N.A. v. Keyser,414 Justice McHugh held that
surrounding a transaction are in conflict, the question of
"[w]here the material 41facts
5
usury is for the jury.,
The court's ruling in Gavitt v. Swiger4 16 formed the basis of the holding in
Chambers v. Sovereign Coal Corp.n17 Justice McHugh wrote in Chambers that
"[a] motion for summary judgment should be granted only when it is clear that
there is no genuine issue of fact to be tried and inquiry concerning the facts is not
desirable to clarify the application of the law., 418
Justice McHugh addressed the procedure for resisting summary judgment
when discovery is incomplete in the case of Crain v. Lightner.419 The court held
that
[w]here a party is unable to resist a motion for summary judgment
because of an inadequate opportunity to conduct discovery, that
party should file an affidavit pursuant to W. Va. R. Civ. P. 56(f)
and obtain a ruling thereon by the trial court. Such affidavit and
ruling thereon, or other evidence that the question of a premature
summary judgment motion was presented to and decided by the
trial court, must be included in the appellate record to preserve the
error for review by this Court.420
In Smith v. Buege,42' Justice McHugh held that
[a] motion for summary judgment under W. Va. R. Civ. P. 56
must be denied when the moving party merely makes the
conclusory assertion that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as
a matter of law.4 2
C.

Default Judgment
Justice McHugh addressed default judgment in Bell v. Inland Mutual

414

285 S.E.2d 424 (W. Va. 1981).

415

Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.

416

248 S.E.2d 849 (W. Va. 1978).

417

295 S.E.2d 28 (W. Va. 1982).

418

Id. at Syl.

419
420

364 S.E.2d 778 (W. Va. 1987).
Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.

421

387 S.E.2d 109 (W. Va. 1989).

422

Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.
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Insurance Co. 423 He said in Bell that
[t]he restriction contained in W. Va. R. Civ. P. 54(c) that "[a]
judgment by default shall not be different in kind from or exceed
in amount that prayed for in the demand for judgment," does not
apply where the judgment by default has been rendered as the
result of the defaulting party's failure to obey an order of the
circuit court to provide or permit discovery under W. Va. R. Civ.
P. 37(b) and the defaulting party otherwise appears at the
subsequent trial on the issue of damages.424

D.

Judgment on Less Than All Claims orParties
Justice McHugh said in Smith v. Buege425 that
[u]nder W. Va. R. Civ. P. 54(b), an order relating to less than all
of multiple parties is not a final, appealable judgment unless the
order expressly states that it is a final order and contains an
express determination that there is no just reason for delay in final
adjudication of the rights and liabilities in question.4 26

E.

Service of Process
Justice McHugh held in Sauls v. Howell4 27 that
[a] judgment debtor is entitled to notice that suggestion
proceedings under chapter 38, article 5, of the West Virginia Code
have been instituted by a judgment creditor, and the judgment
debtor shall be entitled pursuant to that notice to a copy of the
summons issued under the provisions of W.Va. Code, 38-5-10
[1931], upon the suggestion.42

F.

PersonalJurisdiction

The subject of personal jurisdiction was addressed in Abbott v.
Owens-Coming FiberglasCorp.429 Justice McHugh wrote:
423

332 S.E.2d 127 (W. Va. 1985).

424

Id. at SylPt. 8.

425

387 S.E.2d 109 (W. Va. 1989).

426

Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.

427

309 S.E.2d 26 (W. Va. 1983).

428

Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.

429

444 S.E.2d 285 (W. Va. 1994).
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A court must use a two-step approach when analyzing whether
personal jurisdiction exists over a foreign corporation or other
nonresident. The first step involves determining whether the
defendant's actions satisfy our personal jurisdiction statutes set
forth in W.Va. Code, 31-1-15 [1984] and W.Va. Code, 56-3-33
[1984]. The second step involves determining whether the
defendant's contacts with the forum state satisfy federal due
process. 430
Justice McHugh held in State ex rel. Bell Atlantic-West Virginia, Inc. v.
Ranson431 that
[w]hen a defendant files a motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction under W.Va.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(2), the circuit court may
rule on the motion upon the pleadings, affidavits and other
documentary evidence or the court may permit discovery to aid in
its decision. At this stage, the party asserting jurisdiction need
only make a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction in order
to survive the motion to dismiss. In determining whether a party
has made a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction, the court
must view the allegations in the light most favorable to such party,
drawing all inferences in favor of jurisdiction. If, however, the
court conducts a pretrial evidentiary hearing on the motion, or if
the personal jurisdiction issue is litigated at trial, the party
asserting jurisdiction must prove jurisdiction by a preponderance
of the evidence.432
G.

Joinderof Parties
Justice McHugh held in Anderson v. McDonaladf that
[w]hen a release of liability is obtained by the representative of an
insurance company and in a negligence action against the insured,
the insured pleads the release as an affirmative defense pursuant to
W.Va.R.Civ.P. 8(c), and the plaintiff has moved to join the
insurance company as a party to the action, the trial judge may
join the insurance company as a party to the action pursuant to
W.Va.R.Civ.P. 20.

430

Id. at Syl. Pt. 5.

431

497 S.E.2d 755 (W. Va. 1997).

432

Id. at Syl. Pt. 4.

433

289 S.E.2d 729 (W. Va. 1982).

434

Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.
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H.

Laches

Justice McHugh wrote in Maynard v. Board of Education of Wayne
that "[a] party must exercise diligence when seeking to challenge the
legality of a matter involving a public interest, such
' 43 6 as the manner of expenditure of
public funds. Failure to do so constitutes laches.
Justice McHugh wrote in State ex rel. West Virginia4Department
of Health
37
and HumanResources, ChildAdvocate Office v. CarlLee H.:
County "

If the reason a plaintiff delays in bringing an action for
reimbursement child support is because he or she was misled by
the misrepresentations of the defendant as to his or her rights to
bring such action or because the delay was induced by the
defendant, then the defendant may not raise the defense of laches.
However, if the plaintiff does not use due diligence in bringing an
action once he or she learns of the misrepresentations, then the
defendant may raise the defense of laches, provided the defendant
can also demonstrate
that such delay has worked to his or her
43
detriment. 8
L.

Statute ofLimitations
Justice McHugh indicated in State ex rel. Hardesty v. Stalnaker43 9 that
W.Va. Code, 55-2-6 (1923), expressly provides that an action to
recover "... . upon an indemnifying bond taken under any statute,
or upon a bond of an executor, administrator or guardian, curator,
committee, sheriff or deputy sheriff, clerk or deputy clerk, or any
other fiduciary or public officer.. ." shall be brought within ten
years next after the right to bring the same shall have accrued. 440

Justice McHugh said in Charlton v. M.P. Industries, Inc.441 that "[a]
complaint which is amended to add a party, filed in compliance with Rule 5(e) of
the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure, tolls W.Va. Code, 55-2-12(b) [1959],
whether such complaint is amended in accordance with W.Va.R.Civ.P. 15(a) or

435

357 S.E.2d 246 (W.Va. 1987).

436

Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.

437

472 S.E.2d 815 (W. Va. 1996).

438

Id. at Syl. Pt. 6.

439

280 S.E.2d 697 (W. Va. 1981).

440

Id. at Syl. Pt. 1 (alterations in original) (citation omitted).

441

314 S.E.2d 416 (W. Va. 1984).
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442
such party is added in accordance with W.Va.R.Civ.P. 21.,,

In Maynard v. Board of Education of Wayne County"3 Justice McHugh

held:
It is the written employment contract, not the incorporated
statutory law per se, which fixes the liability of a public employer
to its public employees for the purpose of determining the
applicable statute of limitations in a judicial action or proceeding
for noncompliance with such contract and statutory duties
incorporated therein.4 4
Justice McHugh examined tolling of the statute of limitations when a
tortfeasor's identity is wrongfully hidden in the case of Sattler v. Bailey.445 The
court ruled:
The general statute of limitations, W.Va. Code, 55-2-12, as
amended, is tolled, with respect to an undiscovered wrongdoer, by
virtue of the fraudulent concealment or obstruction of prosecution
doctrine embodied in W.Va. Code, 55-2-17, as amended, when an
action is brought timely against the known wrongdoer(s) and,
despite the due diligence of the injured person to discover the
identity of all the wrongdoers, the identity of one or more of them
is hidden by words or acts constituting affirmative concealment,
that is, a "cover-up." Tolling of the statute of limitations with
respect to an undiscovered wrongdoer is especially appropriate in
a case in which, as part of the cover-up, the injured person is
impeded in discovering the identity of the wrongdoer in question
by the invocation of governmental secrecy. In a case involving a
wrongdoer whose identity is affirmatively concealed, the injured
person must bring his or her action against such wrongdoer within
the statutory period after the injured person discovers,446 or
reasonably should have discovered, that wrongdoer's identity.
Justice McHugh wrote in Hayes v. Roberts & Schaefer Co.44 7 that "W.Va.
Code, 55-2A-2 [1959] provides that '[t]he period of limitation applicable to a claim
accruing outside of [West Virginia] shall be either that prescribed by the law of the
place where the claim accrued or by the law of [West Virginia], whichever bars the
442

Id. at Syl.

443

357 S.E.2d 246 (W. Va. 1987).

"4

Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.

445

400 S.E.2d 220 (W. Va. 1990).

446

Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.

447

452 S.E.2d 459 (W. Va. 1994).
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claim.',448

In the case of In re State Public Building Asbestos Litigation,449 Justice
McHugh held that "W.Va. Code, 55-2-19 [1923] abrogates the common law
doctrine of nullum tempus occurrit regi thereby making statutes of limitations
applicable to the State." 450
Justice McHugh wrote in Stone v. UnitedEngineering,a Division of Wean,
Inc.45 l that
W.Va. Code, 55-2-6a, limits the time period in which a suit may
be filed for deficiencies in the planning, design, or supervision of
construction of an improvement to real property to ten years. This
period commences on the date the improvement is occupied or
accepted
by the owner of the real property, whichever occurs
45 2
first.

Justice McHugh also held:
W.Va. Code, 55-2-6a [1983] does not limit the time period in
which a suit may be filed against the owner of real property for
deficiencies in the planning, design, survey, observation or
supervision of construction or actual construction of any
improvement to real property to ten years if that owner planned,
designed, surveyed, observed or supervised the construction or
actually constructed that improvement to real property.4
Justice McHugh concluded Stone by holding:
When determining whether an item is an improvement to real
property under W.Va. Code, 55-2-6a [1983], the statute of repose,
a court must consider the enhanced value created when the item is
put to its intended use, the level of integration of the item within
any manufacturing system, whether the item is an essential
component of the system, and the item's permanence. 4

448
449

450

I. at Syl. PL 2 (alterations in original).
454 S.E.2d 413 (W. Va. 1994).

d.at Syl. Pt. 5.

451

475 S.E.2d 439 (W. Va. 1996).

452

Id. at Syl. Pt. 1. (citation omitted).

453

Id- at Syl. Pt. 2.

454

Id.at Syl. Pt. 3.
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In State ex reL Smith v. Kermit Lumber & Pressure Treating Co., 45 5 Justice
McHugh examined several issues involving the statute of limitations. The court
noted initially that
because the language in W.Va. Code, 55-2-19 [1923] is
unambiguous in stating that "[e]very statute of limitation, unless
otherwise expressly provided, shall apply to the State[,]" the
language in Ralston v. Town of Weston, 46 W.Va. 544, 33 S.E.
326 (1899) and Foley v. Doddridge County Court, 54 W.Va. 16,
46 S.E. 246 (1903) which suggests that statutes of limitation apply
only when the State is acting in its private or proprietary capacity,
is misleading. Thus, to the extent that Ralston and Foley imply
that W.Va. Code, 55-2-19 [1923] only applies when the State is
acting in its private or proprietary capacity, they are hereby
modified.456
Justice McHugh next held in Smith:
W.Va. Code, 55-2-12(c) [1959], which clearly and unambiguously
states that "[e]very personal action for which no limitation is
otherwise prescribed shall be brought... within one year next
after the right to bring the same shall have accrued if it be for any
other matter of such nature that, in case a party die, it could not
have been brought at common law by or against his personal
representative[,]" applies to civil actions brought under the
Hazardous Waste Management Act found in W.Va. Code, 22-18-1
et seq.457

Justice McHugh continued:
The general one-year statute of limitations found in W.Va. Code,
55-2-12(c) [1959] "accrues" when any person "violates" or is
"in violation" of "any provisions of [the Hazardous Waste
Management Act found in W.Va. Code, 22-18-1 et seq.] or any
permit, rule or order issued pursuant to [the Act]." W. Va. Code,
22-18-17(a)(1), 17(b) and 17(c) [1994]. Hazardous wastes which
remain in the environment in amounts above the regulatory limits
Management Act constitute a
set pursuant to the Hazardous Waste
458
continuing violation of the Act.

455

488 S.E.2d 901 (W. Va. 1997).

456

Id. at Syl. Pt. 4 (alterations in original).

457

Id. at Syl. Pt. 5 (alterations in original).

458

Id. at Syl. Pt. 8 (alterations in original).
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Justice McHugh ruled next that
W.Va. Code, 55-2-12(c) [1959], which clearly and unambiguously
states that "[e]very personal action for which no limitation is
otherwise prescribed shall be brought... within one year next
after the right to bring the same shall have accrued if it be for any
other matter of such nature that, in case a party die, it could not
have been brought at common law by or against his personal
representative[,]" applies to civil actions brought under the45Water
9
Pollution Control Act found in W. Va. Code, 22-11-1 et seq.
In Smith, Justice McHugh went on to hold:
The general one-year statute of limitations found in W.Va. Code,
55-2-12(c) [1959] "accrues" when any person "violates any
provision of [the Water Pollution Control Act, found in W.Va.
Code, 22-11-1 et seq.] or of any rule or who violates any standard
or order promulgated or made and entered under the provisions of
[the Act]" or when a "violation occurred or is occurring" under
the Act. W.Va. Code, 22-11-22 [1994]. Thus, any "sewage,
industrial wastes or other wastes, or the effluent therefrom,
produced by or emanating from any point source [and currently]
flow[ing] into the waters of this state[,]" W.Va. Code,
22-11-8(b)(1) [1994], in violation of any provision of the Water
Pollution
Control Act constitutes a continuing violation of the
4 60
Act.

Justice McHugh concluded in Smith that
[w]hen a public nuisance action is brought in order to remediate a
business site containing hazardous waste found in the soil and
flowing into the waters of this State, the one-year statute of
limitations found in W.Va. Code, 55-2-12(c) [1959] does not
accrue until the harm or endangerment to the public health, safety
and the environment is abated. 5 1
J.

Selection ofJury
In West Virginia Department of Highways v. Fisher,4 62justice McHugh

held:
459

Id. at Syl. Pt. 9 (alterations in original).

460

Smith, 488 S.E.2d at Syl. Pt. 10 (alterations in original).

461

Id. at Syl. Pt. 11.

462

289 S.E.2d 213 (W. Va. 1982).
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Where a physician-patient relationship exists between a party to
litigation and a prospective juror, although such prospective juror
is not disqualified per se, special care should be taken by the trial
judge to ascertain, pursuant to W.Va. Code, 56-6-12 [1931], that
such prospective juror is free from bias or prejudice.4
Justice McHugh held in Barker v. Benefit Trust Life Insurance Co.464 that
[w]here a trial by jury has been secured by a party to litigation
under W.Va.R.Civ.P. 38 or 39(b), a party to such litigation has a
right to an impartial and unbiased jury; and, in order to insure that
right, the party is entitled, in the absence of a waiver upon the
record, to meaningful voir dire examination and peremptory
challenges of the prospective jurors.46

K.

Class Action

In addressing the issue of a spurious class action, Justice McHugh ruled in
Burks v. Wymer 66 that
[t]he following factors should be considered by a trial judge in
deciding whether a "spurious" class action may be maintained
under W.Va.R.Civ.P. 23(a)(3):
(1) whether common questions of law or fact
predominate over any questions affecting only
individual members;
(2) whether other means of adjudicating the claims
and defenses are practicable or inefficient;
(3) whether a class action offers the most appropriate
means of adjudicating the claims and defenses;
(4) whether members not representative parties have
a substantial interest in individually controlling
the prosecution or defense of separate actions;
(5) whether the class action involves a claim that is or
has been the subject of a class action, a
463

Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.

464
465

324 S.E.2d 148 (W. Va. 1984).
Id. at Syl.

466

307 S.E.2d 647 (W. Va. 1983).
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government action, or other proceeding;
(6) whether it is desirable to bring the class action in
another forum;
(7) whether management of the class action poses
unusual difficulties;
(8) whether any conflict of laws issues involved pose
unusual difficulties; and
(9) whether the claims of individual class members
are insufficient in the amounts or interests
involved, in view of the complexities of the issues
and the expenses of the litigation, to afford
significant relief to the members of the class.467
L.

Separate Trials

In State ex rel. Appalachian Power Co. v. Ranson,468 Justice McHugh
outlined factors courts should consider in determining whether to consolidate
separate claims for a unitary trial. The court held:
The trial court, when exercising its discretion in deciding
consolidation issues under W.Va.R.Civ.P. 42(a), should consider
the following factors: (1) whether the risks of prejudice and
possible confusion outweigh the considerations of judicial
dispatch and economy; (2) what the burden would be on the
parties, witnesses, and available judicial resources posed by
multiple lawsuits; (3) the length of time required to conclude
multiple lawsuits as compared to the time required to conclude a
single lawsuit; and (4) the relative expense to all concerned of the
single-trial, multiple-trial alternatives. When the trial court
concludes in the exercise of its discretion whether to grant or deny
consolidation, it should set forth in its order granting or denying
consolidation sufficient grounds to establish for review why
consolidation would or would not promote judicial economy and
convenience of the parties, and avoid prejudice and confusion.469
In the case of Anderson v. McDonald,470 Justice McHugh held that "[i]n a
negligence action, the granting of a separate trial upon the issue of the validity of a
467

Id. at Syl.

468

438 S.E.2d 609 (W. Va. 1993).

469

Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.

470

289 S.E.2d 729 (W. Va. 1982).
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release of liability rests within the discretion of the trial judge."47 1
M.

Involuntary Dismissal

The effects of an involuntary dismissal of an action were addressed by
Justice McHugh in Perlick & Co. v. Lakeview Creditor's Trustee Committee.472
The opinion stated that "[w]hen an action is dismissed pursuant to W.Va.R.Civ.P.
41(b), and that action is not reinstated within three terms after the entry of the order
of dismissal, that dismissal, unless the court otherwise specified, operates as an
adjudication upon the merits." 473
N.

Jury Instructions

In Jenrettv. Smith,474 Justice McHugh held that "[a]n instruction is proper
of the law and if there is sufficient evidence offered at
if it is a correct statement
4 75
trial to support it."
Justice McHugh held in Brammer v. Taylor4 76 that "[w]here [in a trial by
jury] there is competent evidence tending to support a pertinent theory in the case,
trial court to give an instruction presenting such theory when
it is the duty of the'477
requested to do so.
In McGlone v. Superior Trucking Co.,478 Justice McHugh overturned
precedent that did not permit a "missing witness" jury instruction. The court held
that
[t]he unjustified failure of a party in a civil case to call an
available material witness may, if the trier of the facts so finds,
give rise to an inference that the testimony of the "missing"
witness would, if he or she had been called, have been adverse to
the party falling to call such witness. To the extent that syllabus
point 1 of Vandervort v. Fouse, 52 W.Va. 214, 43 S.E. 112
(1902), syllabus point 5 of Garber v. Blatchley, 51 W.Va. 147, 41
S.E. 222 (1902), and syllabus point 3 of Union Trust Co. v.
McClellan, 40 W.Va. 405, 21 S.E. 1025 (1895), are inconsistent

471

Id. at Syl. Pt. 2 (citation omitted).

472

298 S.E.2d 228 (W. Va. 1982).

473

Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.

474

315 S.E.2d 583 (W. Va. 1983).

475

Id. at Syl. Pt. 5.

476

338 S.E.2d 207 (W. Va. 1985).

477

Id. at Syl. Pt. 2 (alteration in original).

478

363 S.E.2d 736 (W. Va. 1987).
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with this opinion, they are hereby overruled.47
The case of Valentine v. Wheeling Electric Co.480 called upon Justice
McHugh to determine whether a jury instruction on public nuisance was
appropriate. Justice McHugh held that
[o]bstructions within the meaning of W.Va. Code, 17-16-1, as
amended, include utility poles erected on a public road in such a
way that they interfere with the use of or prevent the easy, safe
and convenient use of such public road for public travel. Utility
poles erected in such a way are public nuisances within the
contemplation of W.Va. Code, 17-16-1, as amended. Therefore, it
is not error for a trial court to give an instruction stating that to be
a public nuisance, a utility pole must be erected in such a way that
it prevents the easy, safe and convenient use of a public road for
public travel.4 '
0.

JudgmentNotwithstandingthe Verdict

Justice McHugh said in McClung v. Marion County Commission4 2 that
"[i]n a case where the evidence is such that the jury could have properly found for
either party upon the factual issues, a motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict should not be granted." 4 3 The court also held:
Where the trial court granted the motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, but failed to rule on the motion for a
new trial, and the appellate court reverses the entry of the
judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the appellate court has three
dispositional alternatives. The appellate court may (1) reinstate
the jury's verdict and enter judgment thereon; or (2) order a new
trial; or (3) remand the case to the trial court for consideration of
the motion for a new trial. 4"4
P.

New Trial

The issue of granting a new trial based upon juror disqualification or
misconduct was taken up by Justice McHugh in McGlone v. Superior Trucking
479

M at Syl. Pt. 3.

480

376 S.E.2d 588 (W. Va. 1988).

481

Id at Syl. Pt. 1.

482

360 S.E.2d 221 (W. Va. 1987).

483

Id at Syl. Pt. 7.
Id at Syl. Pt. 9.

484
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Co. 485 The opinion held:

Where a new trial is requested on account of alleged
disqualification or misconduct of a juror, it must appear that the
party requesting the new trial called the attention of the court to
the disqualification or misconduct as soon as it was first
discovered or as soon thereafter as the course of the proceedings
would permit; and if the party fails to do so, he or she will be held
to have waived all objections to such juror disqualification or
misconduct, unless it is a matter which could not have been
remedied by calling attention to it at the time it was first
discovered.486
Justice McHugh held in the case of In re State Public Building Asbestos
Litigation487 that
[a] motion for a new trial is governed by a different standard than
a motion for a directed verdict. When a trial judge vacates a jury
verdict and awards a new trial pursuant to Rule 59 of the West
Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure, the trial judge has the authority
to weigh the evidence and consider the credibility of the
witnesses. If the trial judge finds the verdict is against the clear
weight of the evidence, is based on false evidence or will result in
a miscarriage of justice, the trial judge may set aside the verdict,
even if supported by substantial evidence, and grant a new trial. A
trial judge's decision to award a new trial is not subject to
appellate review unless the trial judge abuses his or her
discretion.488
Justice McHugh was asked in Maynard v. Adkins48 9 to determine whether
the trial court was correct in awarding a new trial on the basis of an alleged conflict
of interest by counsel for plaintiff. The court held:
Where an attorney, as co-counsel, represented a plaintiff in a
personal injury action and, in an unrelated matter, represented the
personal representative of an estate of which the defendant was a
beneficiary, the trial court abused its discretion in granting a new
trial for the defendant upon those circumstances, where (1) the
defendant attended neither the trial nor any pretrial proceedings
485

363 S.E.2d 736 (W. Va. 1987).

486

Id. at Syl. Pt. 5 (citation omitted).

487

454 S.E.2d 413 (W. Va. 1994).

488

Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.

489

457 S.E.2d 133 (W. Va. 1995).
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with regard to the personal injury action and (2) the record
revealed no discussions or meetings between the attorney and the
defendant with regard to either the personal injury action or the
estate matter.49 °
Q.

Relieffrom FinalJudgment

Justice McHugh carved out the contours of relief from a final judgment in
the case of N.C. v. W.R.C.491 He initially held that "[i]n addition to a motion for
relief from a final judgment, order or proceeding pursuant to the reasons set forth in
W.Va.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(1) through (5), the rule specifically provides that a party may
obtain relief from a final judgment, order or proceeding through an independent
action.492
Justice McHugh next held that "[t]he definition of an independent action,
as contemplated by W.Va.R.Civ.P. 60(b), is an equitable action that does not
relitigate the issues of the final judgment, order or proceeding from which relief is
sought and is one that is limited to special circumstances." 493
Justice McHugh concluded:
In order to obtain relief from a final judgment, order or proceeding
through an independent action, the independent action must
contain the following elements: (1) the final judgment, order or
proceeding from which relief is sought must be one that, in equity
and good conscience, should not be enforced; (2) the party
seeking relief should have a good defense to the cause of action
upon which the final judgment, order or proceeding is based; (3)
there must have been fraud, accident or mistake that prevented the
party seeking relief from obtaining the benefit of his defense; (4)
there must be absence of fault or negligence on the part of the
party seeking relief; and (5) there must be no adequate legal
remedy.4 '
Justice McHugh indicated in Cruciottiv. McNee149S that "Rule 60(b) of the
West Virginia
Rules of Civil Procedure should be liberally construed to accomplish
496
justice.1
Justice McHugh outlined the procedural methods for challenging a final
490

Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.

491

317 S.E.2d 793 (W. Va. 1984).

492

Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.

493

Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.

494

Ia at Syl. Pt. 3.

495

396 S.E.2d 191 (W. Va. 1990).

496

Id. at Syl. Pt. 5.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2002

15

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 102, Iss. 5 [2002], Art. 9
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 102

order in State ex rel. McDowell County Sheriff's Department v. Stephens.49 r He
wrote:
A party whose case is dismissed under Rule 37 of the West
Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure may appeal the dismissal order,
pursuant to W.Va. Code, 58-5-4 [1990] and West Virginia Rules
of Appellate Procedure 3. In lieu of an appeal, the party may file
a motion to alter or amend the judgment no later than ten days
after the judgment is entered, pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the West
Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure. If such motion is not timely
filed, a party, under appropriate circumstances, may seek relief
from a final judgment, order or proceeding for the reasons set
forth in Rule 60(b) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil
Procedure.498
Justice McHugh wrote in Nancy Darlene M. v. James Lee M.49 9 that
Rule 60(b)(5) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure,
which permits relief from a judgment where "it is no longer
equitable that the judgment should have prospective application,"
is ordinarily limited to instances where the controlling
circumstances of the action have changed subsequent to the entry
of the judgment and is not to be invoked as a substitute for an
appeal; in considering a motion for relief under Rule 60(b)(5), a
circuit court should proceed with caution.0 0
R.

Motion in Limine

Justice McHugh stated in Daniel v. Stevens50 1 that "[n]otice of a written
motion in limine presented during a hearing or trial need not be served
in
5 2
accordance with Rule 6(d) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure."7 0
S.

Discovery Sanctions

Justice McHugh was called upon to outline the contours of imposing a
sanction for violating a trial court's discovery order in Bell v. Inland Mutual

497

452 S.E.2d 432 (W. Va. 1994).

498

Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.

499

464 S.E.2d 795 (W. Va. 1995).

500

Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.

501

394 S.E.2d 79 (W. Va. 1990).

502

Id. at Syl. Pt. 4.
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Insurance Co. 503 The opinion noted initially:
Where a party's counsel intentionally or with gross negligence
fails to obey an order of a circuit court to provide or permit
discovery, the full range of sanctions under W.Va.R.Civ.P. 37(b)
is available to the court and the party represented by that counsel
must bear the consequences of counsel's actions. 5°4
Justice McHugh then held:
Although the party seeking sanctions under W.Va.R.Civ.P. 37(b)
has the burden of establishing noncompliance with the circuit
court's order to provide or permit discovery, once established, the
burden is upon the disobedient party to avoid the sanctions sought
under W.Va.R.Civ.P. 37(b) by showing that the inability to
comply or special circumstances render the particular sanctions
unjust."
Justice McHugh concluded in Bell that
[t]he striking of pleadings and the rendering of judgment by
default against a party as sanctions under W.Va.R.Civ.P. 37(b) for
that party's failure to obey an order of a circuit court to provide or
permit discovery may be imposed by the court where it has been
established through an evidentiary hearing and in light of the full
record before the court that the failure to comply has been due to
willfulness, bad faith or fault of the disobedient party and not the
inability
to comply and, further, that such sanctions are otherwise
506
just.
Justice McHugh addressed the issue of being held in contempt of court as a
sanction for violating a discovery order in the case of Vincent v. Preiser.507 The
court stated that
[a] movant for a protective order under W.Va.R.Civ.P. 26(c)(4)
may be held in contempt of court, under W.Va.R.Civ.P.
37(b)(2)(D), for failure to comply with court orders compelling
discovery, where a fair reading of the orders compelling discovery
as well as the circumstances, including repeated oral rulings of the
503

332 S.E.2d 127 (W. Va. 1985).

504

Id at Syl. Pt. 4.

505

Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.

506

Id at Syl. Pt. 2.

507

338 S.E.2d 398 (W. Va. 1985).
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court, indicate that the Rule 26(c)(4) motion(s) have been denied.
The Rule 26(c)(4) movant in such a case, by filing such motion(s),
does not, in effect, grant himself a protective order until the court
formally denies the motion(s) for protective order.508
T.

DepositingMoney with Court
Justice McHugh stated in Arcuri v. Great American Insurance Co.50 9 that

W.Va.R.Civ.P. 67 contemplates that a deposit or payment into
court be with leave of court and that the money ordered deposited
be subject to the exclusive control of the court. The party making
the deposit must surrender all control over the money 1to0 the court,
not to other persons claiming an interest in the money.
U.

Forum Non Conveniens

Justice McHugh indicated in Gardner v. Norfolk & Western Railroad
Co.511 that

[t]he common-law principle of forum non conveniens and the
similar state statute on removal of civil proceedings, W.Va. Code,
56-9-1 [1939], are not applicable to actions brought in the courts
of this State under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45
U.S.C. §§ 51-60, as amended, in light of the strong policy
favoring the plaintiffs' choice of forum in such cases and in light
of the strong policy of W.Va. 512Const. art. m, §. 17 providing
access to the courts of this State.
In Abbott v.

Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp.5 13

Justice

McHugh

elaborated on the doctrine of forum non conveniens. Justice McHugh wrote:
The framework to analyze whether the common law doctrine of
forum non conveniens is applicable has been set forth in Norfolk
and Western Ry. Co. v. Tsapis, 184 W.Va. 231, 400 S.E.2d 239
(1990). This framework ensures that the doctrine of forum non
conveniens is applied flexibly and on a case-by-case basis. A
508

Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.

509

342 S.E.2d 177 (W. Va. 1986).

510

Id. at Syl. Pt. 4.

511

372 S.E.2d 786 (W. Va. 1988).
Id. at Syl.

512
513

444 S.E.2d 285 (W. Va. 1994).
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presumption that the forum is convenient when a defendant is a
resident of that forum would undercut the flexibility of the
doctrine.5 14
V.

Venue

Justice McHugh addressed the issue of venue in the context of a legal
15
malpractice action in the case of McGuire v. Fitzsimmons. The court held that
[u]nder W.Va. Code, 56-1-1(a)(1) [1986] when determining venue
in a legal malpractice case, a circuit court can find venue proper
based on where either the defendants reside or the cause of action
for the legal malpractice suit arose. The circuit court may find
venue to be proper in more than one county. Venue based on
where the cause of action for the legal malpractice suit arose is
proper in the following counties: (1) where the attorney's
employment was contracted, that is, where the duty came into
existence; or (2) where the breach or violation of the duty
occurred; or (3) where the manifestation of the breachsubstantial damage--occurred.51 6
W.

Res Judicata

In Sattler v. Bailey,s17 Justice McHugh addressed the application of res
judicata to a state cause of action dismissed in federal court. He held that
[w]hen the federal claim in a federal action is dismissed by the
federal court prior to trial, and, therefore, it is clear that the federal
court would have declined to exercise jurisdiction of a related
state claim which could have been raised in the federal action
pursuant to the "pendent" jurisdiction of the federal court, a
subsequent action in a state court on the state claim which would
have been dismissed, without prejudice, in the prior federal action
is not barred by the doctrine of res judicata.518
X.

Attorney Conflict of Interest

Justice McHugh addressed the issue of appearance of conflict of interest

514

Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.

515

475 S.E.2d 132 (W. Va. 1996).

516

Id. at Syl.

517

400 S.E.2d 220 (W. Va. 1990).

518

Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.
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by an attorney in the case of Garlow v. Zakaib.5 19 The court held that
[a] circuit court, upon motion of a party, by its inherent power to
do what is reasonably necessary for the administration of justice,
may disqualify a lawyer from a case because the lawyer's
representation in the case presents a conflict of interest where the
conflict is such as clearly to call in question the fair or efficient
administration of justice. Such motion should be viewed with
extreme caution because of the interference with the lawyer-client
relationship."'
Justice McHugh also stated in Garlow that
[b]efore a circuit court disqualifies a lawyer in a case because the
lawyer's representation may conflict with the Rules of
Professional Conduct, a record must be made so that the circuit
court may determine whether disqualification is proper.
Furthermore, this Court will not review a circuit court's order
disqualifying a lawyer unless the circuit court's order is based
upon an adequately developed record. In the alternative, if the
circuit court's order disqualifying a lawyer is based upon an
inadequately developed record, this Court, under appropriate
circumstances, may remand a case to the circuit court for
development of an adequate record.52 '
Y.

GuardianAd Litem for IncarceratedParty

Justice McHugh addressed the role of trial courts when a guardian ad litem
fails to appear in an action on behalf of an incarcerated party in the case of Jackson
General Hospitalv. Davis.5 2 Justice McHugh held:

Where a guardian ad litem who has been appointed, pursuant to
W.Va.R.Civ.P. 17(c), to defend an incarcerated convict in a civil
action, and who has been properly served with process concerning
the action, fails to appear, plead or otherwise defend, the circuit
court, prior to entry of a default judgment, has a duty, under
W.Va.R.Civ.P. 55(b), to make an investigation or conduct a
hearing upon the record concerning the guardian ad litem's
representation of the incarcerated convict and, in addition, may
order that the guardian ad litem be served with written notice of
519

413 S.E.2d 112 (W. Va. 1991).

520

Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.

521

Id. at Syl. Pt. 5.

522

464 S.E.2d 593 (W. Va. 1995).
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the application for default judgment, as if the guardian ad litem
had appeared in the action.523
Z.

GuardianAd Litem for Incompetent Party

Justice McHugh was concerned with appointment of a guardian ad litem
for an incompetent person in the case of State ex reL McMahon v. Hamilton. 24
Justice McHugh noted as a general matter that
[u]nder W.Va.R.Civ.P. 17(c), whenever an infant, incompetent
person, or convict has a duly qualified representative, such as a
guardian, curator, committee or other like fiduciary, such
representative may sue or defend on behalf of the infant,
incompetent person, or convict. If a person under any disability
does not have a duly qualified representative he may sue by his
next friend. The court shall appoint a discreet and competent
attorney at law as guardian ad litem for an infant, incompetent
person, or convict not otherwise represented in an action, or the
court shall make such other order as 52
it5 deems proper for the
protection of any person under disability.
The court next held that
[w]here a substantial question exists regarding the mental
competency of a party not otherwise represented to proceed with
the litigation presently before the court, the court may, where
there is good cause shown, require the party to undergo a mental
examination in order to determine whether a guardian ad litem
should be appointed to protect the party's interests pursuant to
West Virginia Rule of Civil Procedure 17(c).526
Justice McHugh concluded:
When a court orders a party to undergo a mental examination by a
psychiatrist to determine whether a guardian ad litem should be
appointed to protect the party's interests under West Virginia Rule
of Civil Procedure 17(c), the court shall receive a copy of the
appointed psychiatrist's report of such examination. Pursuant to
W.Va. Code, 27-3-1(b)(3) [1977], the court may release such
report only if it finds that it is sufficiently relevant to a proceeding
523

Id. at Syl. Pt. 4.

524

482 S.E.2d 192 (W. Va. 1996).

525

Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.

526

Id. at Syl. PL 4.
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before the court to outweigh the importance of maintaining the
confidentiality established by W.Va. Code, 27-3-1(a) [1977].527
VI. DOMESTIC
A.

RELATIONS

Civil Child Abuse and Neglect

The case of In Interest of S.C. 52 a required Justice McHugh to examine
issues regarding the burden of proof in civil child abuse and neglect proceedings.
Justice McHugh held that
W.Va. Code, 49-6-2(c) [1980], requires the State Department of
Welfare, in a child abuse or neglect case, to prove "conditions
existing at the time of the filing of the petition.., by clear and
convincing proof." The statute, however, does not specify any
particular manner or mode of testimony or evidence by which the
State Department of Welfare is obligated to meet this burden.529
Justice McHugh concluded in In Interest of S.C. that "[e]ven when an
improvement period is granted, the burden of proof in a child neglect or abuse case
does not shift from the State Department of Welfare to the parent, guardian or
custodian of the child.
It remains upon the State Department of Welfare throughout
5 30
the proceedings.
Justice McHugh addressed terminating parental rights due to neglect or
abuse in Interest of DarlaB.5 31 The court held initially that
[t]he decision of a circuit court terminating the rights of parents to
their child pursuant to W.Va. Code, 49-6-5 [1977], will not be
reversed by this Court for failure to grant the parents an
improvement period, where the evidence supports a finding that
the child, 38 days old, suffered from life-threatening injuries in the
form of broken bones and bruises, which could not have occurred
in the manner testified to by the parents, and the circuit court
found "compelling circumstances" for the termination of parental
rights. 32
Justice McHugh concluded in DarlaB. that
527

Id. at Syl. Pt. 6.

528

284 S.E.2d 867 (W. Va. 1981).

529

Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.

530

Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.

531

331 S.E.2d 868 (W. Va. 1985).
Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.
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